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The Effect of Changes in the Purchasing Power
of the Dollar on the Quantum of Damages in
Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Cases'
Some Louisiana decisions state that there is no fixed rule
for determining the quantum of damages in personal injury and
wrongful death cases and that the question of quantum is ad-
dressed largely to the discretion of the judge.2 Others, however,
indicate that the courts should look to earlier cases involving
comparable damage to aid them in arriving at just awards.3 Two
recent decisions, one by a state and the other by a federal court,
recognize that Louisiana judges look to prior cases to maintain
uniformity among recoveries. 4 In other jurisdictions, appellate
courts frequently consider prior recoveries for similar types of
damage to determine whether or not a jury verdict is excessive.5
But some courts have abandoned this practice, reasoning that
the fluctuation in the purchasing power of the dollar is such0
1. See Comment, Damages for Personal Injuries and the Shrinking Dol-
lar, 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 580 (1947); Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 611 (1950).
2. Hecht v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 62 So.2d 520 (La. App. 1953);
Ernst v. New Orleans Public Belt R.R., 55 So.2d 657 (La. App. 1951); Grissom
v. Heard, 47 So.2d 108 (La. App. 1950); Hare v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,
1 So.2d 439 (La. App. 1941); LeBlanc v. Checker Cab Co., 8 La. App. 472
(1928); Parks v. Hall, 182 So. 347 (La. App. 1938).
3. Grissom v. Heard, 47 So.2d 108 (La. App. 1950); Eleazar v. Illinois
Central R.R., 24 So.2d 387 (La. App. 1946); Hare v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Co., 1 So.2d 439 (La. App. 1941); Hobbs v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp.,
188 So. 191 (La. App. 1939); Wilcox v. B. Olinde & Sons, 182 So. 149 (La. App.
1938); Matheny v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 181 So. 647 (La.
App. 1938).
4. Gillen v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 198 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1952); Wain-
wright v. Globe Indemnity Co., 75 So.2d 554 (La. App. 1954).
5. See, e.g., Aetna Oil Co. v. Metcalf, 300 Ky. 817, 190 S.W.2d 562 (1945);
cases are collected in Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 3, 27 (1951).
6. The following table illustrates the changes in the purchasing power of
the dollar for the period from 1913 to the present. It is the United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index which was originated as
an aid in the settlement of wage negotiations. It is still widely used for this
purpose. The index is obtained by combining six group indexes: (1) food;
(2) clothing; (3) rent; (4) fuel, electricity, and ice; (5) house furnishings;
(6) miscellaneous goods and services. As the price index rises, the purchas-
ing power of the dollar falls proportionately. The base figure of 100 is
computed on the price level of 1947-1949.
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX-UNITED STATES AVERAGE
ALL ITEMS
Year Price Index Year Price Index
1913 42.3 1934 57.2
1914 42.9 1935 58.7
1915 43.4 1936 59.3
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that comparison of cases from different periods is of little value.7
It has recently been held that, in diversity of citizenship cases,
federal district courts sitting in Louisiana may not instruct the
jury to consider, in arriving at the amount of damages, prior
state court awards for comparable damage. 8
Awards in personal injury and wrongful death cases purport
to be indemnifications for two types of damages, pecuniary and
non-pecuniary in character. In fixing the amount of recovery for
such items of pecuniary damage as medical expenses and the loss
of past earnings, the relevance of prior cases is questionable.
The amount of recovery for this type of damage can be deter-
mined simply by considering the actual loss of expenditure of
money. The same is true of the loss of probable future earnings,
Year Price Index Year Price Index
1916 46.6 1937 61.4
1917 54.8 1938 60.3
1918 64.3 1939 59.4
1919 74.0 1940 59.9
1920 85.7 1941 62.9
1921 76.4 1942 69.7
1922 71.6 1943 74.0
1923 72.9 1944 75.2
1924 73.1 1945 76.9
1925 75.0 1946 83.4
1926 75.6 1947 95.5
1927 74.2 1948 102.8
1928 73.3 1949 101.8
1929 73.3 1950 102.8
1930 71.4 1951 111.0
1931 65.0 1952 113.5
1932 58.4 1953 114.4
1933 55.3 1954 115.1*
* A yearly index is not yet available. The index for June 1954 is used.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, 77 MONTHLY LABOR
RaV. 1185 (October 1954).
In order to find the number of 1953 dollars necessary to equal the pur-
chasing power of $1000 in 1933, a proportion can be set up as follows:





It would take approximately $2068 in 1953 in order to equal $1000 in 1933.
7. See, e.g., Taylor-Green Gas Co. v. Newcomb, 302 Ky. 564, 195 S.W.2d
307 (1946); Koenigs v. Thome, 226 Minn. 14, 31 N.W.2d 534 (1948); cases are
collected in Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 611, 627 (1950).
8. Gillen v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., 198 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1952); State
Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Scott, 198 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1952) (no error in
trial judge's refusal to allow counsel to argue to the jury quantum of awards
made in similar Louisiana cases).
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which should be calculated on the basis of life expectancy and
typical occupational experience. However, there may be justifi-
cation for consulting prior cases involving comparable damage
to determine the amount of recovery for pain and suffering, for
the loss of limbs and human faculties, and for the family's be-
reavement in wrongful death cases. This type of non-pecuniary
damage does not readily lend itself to measurement in terms of
money, and the courts may need the guidance of prior cases to
arrive at a just award. Moreover, the practice maintains a cer-
tain uniformity among similar cases, and this result may be
desirable. Many Louisiana decisions take into account this im-
portant difference in the relevancy of prior cases to different
types of damagef In others, the courts have simply compared
the trial court's award as a whole to the judgments in similar
cases without segregating the items of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damage.10 Even when the use of prior cases is limited
to the determination of the quantum of damages for non-pecuni-
ary harms, however, injustice will result if the change in the
purchasing power of the dollar since those cases were decided is
not taken into consideration.
In view of this possible injustice, Louisiana courts do con-
sider increases and decreases in the value of the dollar." This
9: Morgan v. Kreppier, 60 So.2d 139 (La. App. 1952); Eleazar v. Illinois
Central Ry., 24 So.2d 387 (La. App. 1946); Brown v. Homer-Doyline Bus
Lines, 23 So.2d 348 (La. App. 1945); Stromer v. Dupont, 150 So. 32 (La. App.
1933). See also Hawkins v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 74 So.2d 323 (La. App.
1954); Richey v. Service Dry Cleaners, 28 So.2d 284 (La. App. 1946) (award to
wife for injuries, to husband for expenses; award to wife raised on appeal);
Hero v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 19 So.2d 887 (La. App. 1944); Weadock v.
Eagle Indemnity Co., 15 So.2d 132 (La. App. 1943); Killian v. Modern Iron
Works, 15 So.2d 532 (La. App. 1943); Hartman v. Aschaffenburg, 12 So.2d
282 (La. App. 1943).
10. Schneller v. Louisiana State Rice Milling Co., 148 La. 88, 86 So.
663 (1920); Cross v. Lee Lumber Co., 130 La. 66, 57 So. 631 (1912) (no refer-
ence to specific prior cases); Dole v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 121 La.
945, 46 So. 929 (1908) (no reference to specific prior cases); Jakubec v.
Southern Bus Lines, 31 So.2d 282 (La. App. 1947); Bell v. First Nat. Life
Ins. Co., 141 So. 484 (La. App. 1932) (prior cases cited).
11. Schneller v. Louisiana State Rice Milling Co., 148 La. 88, 86 So. 663
(1920); Cross v. Lee Lumber Co., 130 La. 66, 57 So. 631 (1912); Rogers v.
Allen Lumber Co., 129 La. 900, 57 So. 166 (1912); Dole v. New Orleans Rail-
way & Light Co., 121 La. 945, 46 So. 929 (1908); Short v. Central Louisiana
Electric Co., 36 So.2d 658 (La. App. 1948); Jakubec v. Southern Bus Lines,
31 So.2d 282 (La. App. 1947); Richey v. Service Dry Cleaners, 28 So.2d 284
(La. App. 1946); Eleazar v. Illinois Central R.R., 24 So.2d 387 (La. App. 1946);
Brown v. Homer-Doyline Bus Lines, 23 So.2d 348 (La. App. 1945); Levy v.
New Orleans & N.E.R.R., 20 So.2d 559 (La. App. 1945); Hero v. Toye Bros.
Yellow Cab Co., 19 So.2d 887 (La. App. 1944); Killian v. Modern Iron Works,
15 So.2d 532 (La. App. 1943); Weadock v. Eagle Indemnity Co., 15 So.2d 132
(La. App. 1943); Kelly v. Neff, 14 So.2d 657 (La. App. 1943); Scott v. Claiborne
Electric Cooperative, 13 So.2d 524 (La. App. 1943); Hartman v. Aschaffen-
burg, 12 So.2d 282 (La. App. 1943); Kaough v. Hadley, 165 So. 748 (La. App.
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is the view taken in other American jurisdictions 1 2 and also in
Canada.13 It is clear that without the use of former cases, the
quantum of damages in a personal injury or wrongful death case
would naturally be based upon the amount of money required
to indemnify plaintiff in terms of the purchasing power of the
dollar at the moment of judgment. Consequently, since in diver-
sity of citizenship cases, federal courts sitting in Louisiana may
not instruct the jury to consider prior awards, there is no need
for instructing them to consider changes in the purchasing power
of the dollar.14 It would seem that the Louisiana courts may
take judicial notice of official statistics compiled by such govern-
ment agencies as the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 5 but they will
not accept figures arrived at by writers in ordinary trade
journals. 6
Although the Louisiana courts have frequently considered
the change in the purchasing power of the dollar,17 their treat-
ment of this factor has not been uniform. In many cases the
court has merely mentioned the change without reference to any
1936); Van Baast v. Thibaut Feed Mills, 151 So. 226 (La. App. 1933); Donald-
son v. Riddling's Succession, 145 So. 804 (La. App. 1933); Stromer v. Dupont,
150 So. 32 (La. App. 1933); Wyble. v. Putfork, 141 So. 776 (La. App. 1932);
Bell v. First National Life Insurance Co., 141 So. 484 (La. App. 1932); New
Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Soileau, 167 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1948).
12. Purchasing power of the dollar is an element to be considered:
American Bus Lines v. Merritt, 221 Ark. 596, 254 S.W.2d 963 (1953); Gaster v.
Hicks, 181 Ark. 299, 25 S.W.2d 760 (1930); Barnett v. Furst, 99 Cal. App.2d
767, 222 P.2d 470 (1950); Hayward v. Yost, 72 Idaho 415, 242 P.2d 971 (1952);
King's Indiana Billiard Co. v. Winters, 106 N.E.2d 713 (Ind. App. 1952); J. C.
Penney Co. v. Livingston, 271 S.W.2d 906 (Ky. App. 1954); Johnson v. St. Paul
City R.R., 67 Minn. 260, 69 N.W. 900 (1897); Gale v. New York Central &
H.R.R., 13 Hun 1 (N.Y. 1878); Fort Worth & Denver City Ry. v. Gifford,
252 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). Contra, Canfield v. Chicago R.I. & P.
Ry., 142 Iowa 658, 121 N.W. 186 (1909) (the court said that plaintiff's salary
had not increased with the rise in cost of living, and, therefore, had he lived
to his full expectancy, he would not have accumulated as much as he would
have before the increase in the cost of living. The court did not consider
the fact that wages will increase generally as prices increase, though at a
slower rate).
Courts take judicial notice of change in purchasing power: Missouri Pac.
R.R. v. Elvins, 176 Ark. 737, 4 S.W.2d 528 (1928); Hooton v. City of Burley,
70 Idaho 369, 219 P.2d 651 (1950); Swanson v. J. L. Shiely Co., 234 Minn. 548,
48 N.W.2d 848 (1951); Moore v. Public Service Coordinated Transport, 15 N.J.
Super. 499, 83 A.2d 725 (1951).
13. Donoghue v. Magee & Barron, 1 W.W.R. 70 (1949); Rodzinski v.
Modern Dairies Ltd., 2 W.W.R. 456 (1949); Carter, Assessment of Damages
for Personal Injuries or Death in the Courts of the Common-law Provinces,
32 CAN. B. REV. 713 (1954).
14. But see New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Soileau, 167 F.2d 767 (5th
Cir. 1948), decided before cases cited in note 8 supra.
15. See Armentrout v. Virginian Ry., 72 F. Supp. 997 (S.D. W.Va. 1947).
16. Bell v. First National Life Ins. Co., 141 So. 484 (La. App. 1932).
17. See cases cited note 11 supra.
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specific periods.18 In others, the court has mentioned the change
without reference to any previous case.19 In still others, prior
awards for comparable damage have been considered and the
general change in the purchasing power of the dollar from the
time of the prior case to the present has been mentioned. The
usual practice has been to refer to the general change in purchas-
ing power instead of specific figures. For example, in Eleazar v.
Illinois Central R.R. (1946),20 the court considered the award of
$3000 in a 1942 case, Hero v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co.,21 in-
volving similar injuries, mentioned the decreased purchasing
power of the dollar, and sustained a trial court judgment of
$4000. The court was undoubtedly influenced, however, by the
fact that plaintiff's injuries were more serious than those of the
plaintiff in the previous case. In the Hero case,22 the court re-
viewed prior recoveries for injuries similar to plaintiff's injuries
and upheld a slightly higher trial court judgment 2 3 taking into
account the decreased purchasing power of the dollar. Similarly,
in Levy v. New Orleans N.E.R.R.24 and Stromer v. DuPont,25
consideration of the change in purchasing power led to the up-
holding of trial court awards slightly different from those in
earlier comparable cases. In these cases, the change in the dol-
lar's purchasing power was mentioned in support of the court's
refusal to disturb a trial court award alleged to be excessive or
inadequate. In Morgan v. Kreppier,26 decided in 1952, however,
the court of appeal, finding that the amount of damages allowed
18. Schneller v. Louisiana Rice Milling Co., 148 La. 88, 86 So. 663 (1920);
Dole v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 121 La. 945, 46 So. 929 (1908) (uphold-
ing a verdict alleged to be excessive); Hawkins v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
74 So.2d 323 (La. App. 1954); Short v. Central Louisiana Electric Co., 36
So.2d 658 (La. App. 1948) (to uphold a verdict alleged to be excessive); Scott
v. Claiborne Electric Cooperative, 13 So.2d 524 (La. App. 1943) (to uphold
a verdict alleged to be excessive); Hartman v. Aschaffenburg, 12 So.2d 282
(La. App. 1943);, Kaough v. Hadley, 165 So. 748 (La. App. 1936); Wyble v.
Putfork, 141 So. 776 (La. App. 1932) (upholding a verdict alleged to be
inadequate).
19. Richey v. Service Dry Cleaners, 28 So.2d 284 (La. App. 1946) (the
award would be adequate "if made a few years ago"); Killian v. Modern
Iron Works, 15 So.2d 532 (La. App. 1943) (the value of the dollar is "approxi-
mately 25% less than a few years ago"); Donaldson v. Riddling's Succession,
145 So. 804 (La. App. 1933) ("the purchasing power of the dollar now is very
much greater than it was three years ago").
20. 24 So.2d 387 (La. App. 1946).
21. 19 So.2d 887 (La. App. 1944).
22. Ibid.
23. The court sustained an award of $3000. The largest prior award in a
similar case was $2500 in 1933. Selby v. Manning, 145 So. 555 (La. App. 1933).
24. 20 So.2d 559 (La. App. 1945).
25. 150 So. 32 (La. App. 1933).
26. 60 So.2d 139 (La. App. 1952).
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by the trial court was based on the recovery in a 1938 case,27
increased the trial court's award to take into account the inter-
vening change in the purchasing power of the dollar. Similarly,
in Bell v. First National Life Ins. Co.,28 decided in 1932, the court
of appeal found that the trial court, in allowing $5000 in damages,
had based its decision on a 1927 case, 29 and thereupon reduced
the trial court's judgment of $4000 to reflect the change in the
value of the dollar since 1927.
The latest Louisiana decision on the effect of such changes
on the quantum of damages in personal injury cases is Wain-
wright v. Globe Indemnity Co.30 In that case, the court stated
that "the unprecedented decrease in the purchasing power of
money '31 is a factor to be considered in fixing the quantum of
damages. The court considered eight cases cited by counsel for
the defendant in an effort to have the trial court's judgment of
$15,000 reduced, and awarded plaintiff $10,000, stating that this
would be more in keeping with awards in similar cases.
This case seems representative of the manner in which the
factor of change in purchasing power has been treated by the
Louisiana courts. Usually, the courts have looked to the prior
recoveries brought to their attention and then mentioned in gen-
eral terms the change in purchasing power in support of their
conclusion that an award is proper. Statistics have seldom been
cited by the courts. But if counsel can show that a recovery
based on similar cases is excessive or inadequate in view of the
exact change in the purchasing power of the dollar, the court
will probably, in view of the jurisprudence, adjust the award
on that basis. This is especially true if counsel's request is sup-
ported by reliable statistics such as those published by the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics. However, whether the courts merely
cite the change in purchasing power as a matter of common
knowledge or look to actual figures furnished by counsel, it is
apparent that this factor is an important one to consider in
arriving at a just award in personal injury and wrongful death
cases.
William J. Doran, Jr.
27. Coste v. H.G. Hill Stores, 178 So. 512 (La. App. 1938).
28. 141 So. 484 (La. App. 1932).
29. Gallman v. Young, 6 La. App. 137 (1927).
30. 75 So.2d 554 (La. App. 1954).
31. Id. at 556.
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